Presidential Messages on Legislation and the Congressional Targets of Lobbying

ABSTRACT Despite strong reasons to expect presidents' announced stances on legislation to influence how organized interests lobby Congress, this effect remains underexplored. I advance a theory that Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs), sent by presidents to Congress to convey their positions on legislation, may also send signals to interest groups about when to lobby Congress and which legislators to lobby. To test it, I analyze panel data combining SAPs issued by Clinton to Biden, records of lobbying contact extracted from reports filed under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and committee and floor agendas in Congress. Analysis of both committee and legislator data shows that SAPs strongly predict whom lobbyists choose to target, and more so than congressional agendas alone can explain. Furthermore, SAPs predict more advocacy specifically by elite lobbying firms. These findings suggest that presidential position‐taking may elicit responses not only from Congress but also from organized interests and draw battle lines for both institutional and outside actors.