Prosecuting the political opposition: the court and subnational variation in the onset of the Maoist conflict in Nepal

Abstract Courts and judicial institutions are often overlooked in armed conflict research. Before the rebel group is formed and initiates armed confrontation, states and their allies – directly and indirectly – mobilize the court to prosecute selected individuals to deter political opposition and establish state legitimacy. This article argues that the state can directly prosecute potential political challengers through criminal cases, deterring aspiring political leaders from organizing a rebellion at the local level. Similarly, the state can indirectly use its local collaborators to prosecute potential civilian supporters in court by filing civil cases, intensifying local discontent, and exacerbating underlying grievances against the state and its local collaborators. The state’s direct and indirect involvement in generating legitimacy affects the subnational risk of conflict onset differently. Analyses of original data for all 75 district-level courts in Nepal between 1991 and 2006 and the onset of the Maoist conflict show robust support for the arguments.