The Paradox of South Korea’s “Developmental State” in the Late 1960s, as Seen through the Brown Memorandum

This study focuses on the paradox of South Korea’s “developmental state,” which pursued “development” through active participation in Third World hot wars, as revealed through the Brown Memorandum concluded in March 1966. When publicizing the Brown Memorandum, the Park Chung-hee regime exaggerated the extent of what it had obtained for the modernization of the South Korean armed forces, portraying it as far more substantial than it actually was, while concealing provisions—such as overseas duty pay and compensation for war casualties—that could have served as evidence for the so-called “mercenary” interpretation of Korean troop dispatch.<br/> After Park secured his reelection and began to express open dissatisfaction with the level of implementation of the Brown Memorandum, the United States, through the ROK-U.S. Joint Working Group, evaluated the implementation rate as approaching nearly 100 percent. Although the South Korean side continued to assess the implementation negatively until 1968-1969, it eventually had little choice but to accept the U.S. interpretation when confronted with pressure from the media and opposition parties.<br/> In this way, the Brown Memorandum was used to sustain the paradox of Park Chung-hee’s developmental state, which pursued “development” through troop dispatch while simultaneously having to exaggerate its military and economic gains beyond their actual level. This study critically reexamines the conventional view that understands the Park regime primarily as a symbol of economic growth, and it contributes to a deeper understanding of the paradox of South Korea’s developmental state produced by the conjunction of Cold War geopolitics and development.