No pain, no gain : the basic value backdrop, normative parthood and the problems with theodicy

This thesis clarifies theodicy’s conditions of adequacy, thereby arguing that global and sceptical responses to evil are misguided, and that theodicy’s personal dimension, while necessary, threatens theism’s premises. S1 reframes the problem of evil in terms of theism’s commitment to a basic value backdrop (BVB), moral and axiological realism, and our ability to respond fittingly to these. Consequently, S1 argues theodicies must preserve God’s status as the uniquely suitable subject of religious attitudes, and the reality of evils, harms. For per our experience, condemnable harms occur. Such judgments must be reliable given the BVB. S2 argues theodicy nonetheless requires harms ultimately be in our interests, compensated: eliminated. S3 attempts to preserve the BVB, arguing compensatory theodicy relies on claims about the justificatory efficacy of predicted future attitudes. I.E., as victims will be grateful for horrors these ultimately pose no challenge to theism. S3 argues this is insufficient because we are personally transformable and reasonable preference depends on character. That you will be grateful for X does not entail X is currently preferable/permissible when gratitude would depend on a personal transformation. S4 develops ‘normative parthood’ to explain how harms are conservable despite post-mortem compensation. S2’s challenge depends on lifetime interests being the normatively-salient ones. Yet as we are transformable in the terms that underwrite our moral considerability (interests, values etc.) our normatively-salient interests can be time-relative, those of selves. Harms to your interests cannot be compensated with goods you find incomprehensible to a subject whose evaluative outlook you do not share, even when you are identical. As what harms one self may benefit another, selves can have distinct prudential status, normative independence. This recovers harm, but as post-mortem compensation is transformative it cannot be theodically effective. Theists require non-theodicean responses to evil; these too must preserve religious suitability, the BVB.

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Publication Details

Journal
St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository)
Published
2026-01-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.17630/sta/1517
Primary Topic
Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Type
article
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article

No pain, no gain : the basic value backdrop, normative parthood and the problems with theodicy

Thomas Corbett
St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository)
Theology and Philosophy of Evil
article

No pain, no gain : the basic value backdrop, normative parthood and the problems with theodicy

Thomas Corbett
article en

Abstract

This thesis clarifies theodicy’s conditions of adequacy, thereby arguing that global and sceptical responses to evil are misguided, and that theodicy’s personal dimension, while necessary, threatens theism’s premises. S1 reframes the problem of evil in terms of theism’s commitment to a basic value backdrop (BVB), moral and axiological realism, and our ability to respond fittingly to these. Consequently, S1 argues theodicies must preserve God’s status as the uniquely suitable subject of religious attitudes, and the reality of evils, harms. For per our experience, condemnable harms occur. Such judgments must be reliable given the BVB. S2 argues theodicy nonetheless requires harms ultimately be in our interests, compensated: eliminated. S3 attempts to preserve the BVB, arguing compensatory theodicy relies on claims about the justificatory efficacy of predicted future attitudes. I.E., as victims will be grateful for horrors these ultimately pose no challenge to theism. S3 argues this is insufficient because we are personally transformable and reasonable preference depends on character. That you will be grateful for X does not entail X is currently preferable/permissible when gratitude would depend on a personal transformation. S4 develops ‘normative parthood’ to explain how harms are conservable despite post-mortem compensation. S2’s challenge depends on lifetime interests being the normatively-salient ones. Yet as we are transformable in the terms that underwrite our moral considerability (interests, values etc.) our normatively-salient interests can be time-relative, those of selves. Harms to your interests cannot be compensated with goods you find incomprehensible to a subject whose evaluative outlook you do not share, even when you are identical. As what harms one self may benefit another, selves can have distinct prudential status, normative independence. This recovers harm, but as post-mortem compensation is transformative it cannot be theodically effective. Theists require non-theodicean responses to evil; these too must preserve religious suitability, the BVB.

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No pain, no gain : the basic value backdrop, normative parthood and the problems with theodicy — Thomas Corbett · St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository) (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS