Evolution, Animal Suffering, Eschatology, and Ethics: Attending and Responding to Creaturely Struggle

This paper explores the ethical implications of an ongoing debate about evolution, animal suffering, and the goodness of God. Christopher Southgate describes a “fault-line” between those who believe the struggle, suffering, and destruction of the evolutionary process are aligned with God’s good purposes in creation and those who regard these evolutionary “disvalues” as contrary to God’s good purposes. Recent efforts at dialogue across the fault line have not resolved this basic disagreement, but have achieved notable consensus on eschatology: both sides share the hope of eschatological fulfilment for other-than-human creatures and an end to the suffering, struggle, and destruction of the present age. One under-explored aspect of this dialogue is its ethical significance; since evolutionary theodicies are theological evaluations of the natural world, they should inform our understanding of what we must do in response to its struggle and suffering. Having outlined the present state of the dialogue, I consider its implications for three particular ethical issues: (1) Eating meat. Southgate and Bethany Sollereder consider meat-eating in itself ethically unproblematic, for reasons not unconnected with their evolutionary theodicies. By contrast, I argue that the eschatological hope they, like me, affirm mandates Christians to refrain from avoidable violence toward our fellow-creatures. For many westerners, “avoidable violence” includes the killing of animals for food. (2) Ending extinction. Southgate has called for humans to be “co-redeemers,” sharing with God in the healing of the evolutionary process, including efforts to combat both anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic species extinction. Skeptical that humans are called to be co-redeemers, I agree that reducing anthropogenic species extinction is a proper act of repentance for the sin of ecological destruction, but am more wary of human attempts to prevent non-anthropogenic extinction. (3) Responding to pain. While I agree with Southgate and Sollereder that pain is usually biologically adaptive in this world, I refer to good scientific evidence for the existence of pain that is non-adaptive and detrimental to the flourishing of both humans and other animals. There is a prima facie ethical obligation to do what is in our power to relieve such pain.