Misinformation as an Event-Model Problem

Why does misinformation continue to influence reasoning even after it has been corrected? Dominant accounts treat this persistence as a failure of belief updating, emphasizing propositional acceptance, motivational resistance, or memory decay. We argue that this view overlooks a key constraint on comprehension: Misinformation is typically encountered within temporally unfolding narratives and integrated into event-structured mental models. Drawing on event cognition, we propose that misinformation often acquires a causal role within an event representation, supporting prediction, explanation, and inference. Corrections that merely negate false information remove a causal element without restoring model completeness, leaving incoherent representations that invite compensatory inference and the reemergence of misinformation. By contrast, our framework predicts that corrections that align with event boundaries and provide factually accurate, causally adequate replacements should be more likely to stabilize updated representations. This event-model perspective unifies continued influence effects, delayed resurgence of misinformation, and inference-based false memory. It suggests that effective interventions must not only revise beliefs but also restore coherence in narrative event models.

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Publication Details

Journal
Perspectives on Psychological Science
Published
2026-09-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916261475284
Primary Topic
Misinformation and Its Impacts
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Misinformation as an Event-Model Problem

Helen Field Fischer, Markus Huff, Jan Pascal Göbel
Perspectives on Psychological Science
Misinformation and Its Impacts
article

Misinformation as an Event-Model Problem

Helen Field Fischer, Markus Huff, Jan Pascal Göbel
article en

Abstract

Why does misinformation continue to influence reasoning even after it has been corrected? Dominant accounts treat this persistence as a failure of belief updating, emphasizing propositional acceptance, motivational resistance, or memory decay. We argue that this view overlooks a key constraint on comprehension: Misinformation is typically encountered within temporally unfolding narratives and integrated into event-structured mental models. Drawing on event cognition, we propose that misinformation often acquires a causal role within an event representation, supporting prediction, explanation, and inference. Corrections that merely negate false information remove a causal element without restoring model completeness, leaving incoherent representations that invite compensatory inference and the reemergence of misinformation. By contrast, our framework predicts that corrections that align with event boundaries and provide factually accurate, causally adequate replacements should be more likely to stabilize updated representations. This event-model perspective unifies continued influence effects, delayed resurgence of misinformation, and inference-based false memory. It suggests that effective interventions must not only revise beliefs but also restore coherence in narrative event models.

Perspectives on Psychological Science
Leibniz-Institut für Wissensmedien (DE), University of Tübingen (DE)
Openalex Percentile: Top 95%
Misinformation and Its Impacts
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