Erratum to “What Fish ‘Want’ and ‘Like’: Yet Another Perspective on Fish Welfare”

Original citation: Gygax, L., Gansel, L.C. and Hillmann, E. (2025), What Fish ‘Want’ and ‘Like’: Yet Another Perspective on Fish Welfare. Aqua. Fish & Fisheries, 5: e70147. https://doi.org/10.1002/aff2.70147 Embarrassingly, we have misspelled the first author of an article that we repeatedly cite and we deeply apologise for our mistake. The corrections needed in the article are: Page 2, section 1: At this time, it seems that the most extreme positions of those who insist on unequivocal scientific proof of fish welfare concerns beyond any doubt (Diggle et al. 2023) and others who take a more precautionary stance (Sánchez-Suárez et al. 2020; Mason and Lavery 2023) are almost irreconcilable. Corrected to: At this time, it seems that the most extreme positions of those who insist on unequivocal scientific proof of fish welfare concerns beyond any doubt (Diggles et al. 2023) and others who take a more precautionary stance (Sánchez-Suárez et al. 2020; Mason and Lavery 2023) are almost irreconcilable. Page 2, section 2: The doubters advocate that the use of measures indicating biological functioning is sufficient to assess welfare (reflecting health, performance and physiology as listed in Table 2 in Diggle et al. 2023; see also Segner et al. 2012 and Stien et al. 2020). Corrected to: The doubters advocate that the use of measures indicating biological functioning is sufficient to assess welfare (reflecting health, performance and physiology as listed in Table 2 in Diggles et al. 2023; see also Segner et al. 2012 and Stien et al. 2020). Page 4, section 6: Diggle et al. (2023) are correct in stating that such measures of affective-like states are not proof for sentience per se, because the observed reactions may be based on different and simpler mechanisms (not involving feelings). Yet, we disagree with Diggle et al. (2023) in that we think that incremental evidence for sentience is possible for a given species if sentience-like reactions are found in different contexts such as situations assumed to be affective as well as cognitive and in decision-making processes (e.g., Fernö, Folkedal, et al. 2020; Hubená et al. 2022). Corrected to: Diggles et al. (2023) are correct in stating that such measures of affective-like states are not proof for sentience per se, because the observed reactions may be based on different and simpler mechanisms (not involving feelings). Yet, we disagree with Diggles et al. (2023) in that we think that incremental evidence for sentience is possible for a given species if sentience-like reactions are found in different contexts such as situations assumed to be affective as well as cognitive and in decision-making processes (e.g., Fernö, Folkedal, et al. 2020; Hubená et al. 2022). Page 5, section 6: Following the cautionary principle also seems to be fairer towards the industry (but see Diggle et al. 2023). Corrected to: Following the cautionary principle also seems to be fairer towards the industry (but see Diggles et al. 2023). Original reference: Diggle, B. K., R. Arlinghaus, H. I. Browman, et al. 2023. “Reasons to Be Skeptical About Sentience and Pain in Fishes and Aquatic Invertebrates.” Reviews in Fisheries Science & Aquaculture 32: 127–150. https://doi.org/10.1080/23308249.2023.2257802. Corrected to: Diggles, B. K., R. Arlinghaus, H. I. Browman, et al. 2023. “Reasons to Be Skeptical About Sentience and Pain in Fishes and Aquatic Invertebrates.” Reviews in Fisheries Science & Aquaculture 32: 127–150. https://doi.org/10.1080/23308249.2023.2257802.