Service Model Selection for “Internet + Recycling” Platforms: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Door-to-Door vs. Fixed-Point Collection

The rise of “Internet + Recycling” platforms is transforming the domestic waste management landscape, creating dual-channel reverse supply chains where new platforms interact with traditional recyclers. However, these platforms face critical strategic decisions regarding their service portfolios (convenient but costly door-to-door vs. economical fixed-point drop-off) and their relationship with incumbents (cooperation vs. competition). This study aims to determine the optimal pricing, service level, and relationship strategies for an “Internet + Recycling” center to maximize profitability under the influence of consumer channel preferences and government subsidies. We developed four Stackelberg game-theoretic models representing different scenarios of service modes (fixed-point only vs. fixed-point with door-to-door) and relationship structures (cooperation vs. competition). We derived equilibrium solutions for recycling prices, service levels, and profits. Our results reveal that while cooperation generally leads to higher systemic profits, the addition of a door-to-door service significantly alters the strategic landscape. We find that a higher consumer preference for the platform channel allows the center to lower prices while increasing profits, and that government subsidies are the most effective at enhancing service levels in cooperative models. Crucially, intense competition incentivizes recycling centers to reduce rather than increase their service levels to cut costs. This research provides a decision-making framework for recycling enterprises to select optimal service and competitive strategies. It also offers insights for policymakers on how to design subsidies to effectively promote high-convenience recycling services and foster a more efficient circular economy.