Real-World Jammer and Spoofer Localization Using a Low-Cost Array-Based Software-Defined Radio

<title>Abstract</title> Typical single-antenna global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers are highly susceptible to interference, especially from jamming and spoofing attacks. The use of an antenna array at the receiver may mitigate the impact of such attacks on GNSS reception and enable attacker localization. We investigate jammer and spoofer localization using the KrakenSDR, a low-cost multi-channel software-defined radio. The performance of the KrakenSDR was characterized for direction-of-arrival estimation and localization against commercial jammers during the open GNSS test campaign “Jammertest 2023” in Andøya, Norway. The tests included simple scenarios in which the jammer was displaced, as well as car-based jamming and spoofing observed in different receiver setups. Direction finding was accurate across tests for an unobstructed line of sight, which was ensured for simpler tests. The multipath environment affected vehicle-based jammer localization but correctly identified the car’s approach and provided consistent velocity estimates. The driving-based spoofing localization estimated the spoofer position close to its true position and also provided position data from GNSS spoofing.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
NAVIGATION Journal of the Institute of Navigation
Published
2026-01-23
DOI
https://doi.org/10.33012/navi.735
Primary Topic
GNSS positioning and interference
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Real-World Jammer and Spoofer Localization Using a Low-Cost Array-Based Software-Defined Radio

Benjamin B. Elsholm, Daniel Olesen, S.L. Larsen, Lasse Lehmann
NAVIGATION Journal of the Institute of Navigation
GNSS positioning and interference
article

Real-World Jammer and Spoofer Localization Using a Low-Cost Array-Based Software-Defined Radio

Benjamin B. Elsholm, Daniel Olesen, S.L. Larsen, Lasse Lehmann
article en

Abstract

<title>Abstract</title> Typical single-antenna global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers are highly susceptible to interference, especially from jamming and spoofing attacks. The use of an antenna array at the receiver may mitigate the impact of such attacks on GNSS reception and enable attacker localization. We investigate jammer and spoofer localization using the KrakenSDR, a low-cost multi-channel software-defined radio. The performance of the KrakenSDR was characterized for direction-of-arrival estimation and localization against commercial jammers during the open GNSS test campaign “Jammertest 2023” in Andøya, Norway. The tests included simple scenarios in which the jammer was displaced, as well as car-based jamming and spoofing observed in different receiver setups. Direction finding was accurate across tests for an unobstructed line of sight, which was ensured for simpler tests. The multipath environment affected vehicle-based jammer localization but correctly identified the car’s approach and provided consistent velocity estimates. The driving-based spoofing localization estimated the spoofer position close to its true position and also provided position data from GNSS spoofing.

NAVIGATION Journal of the Institute of NavigationVol. 73(1)
Openalex Percentile: Top 83%
GNSS positioning and interference
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