Ontologization as an Epistemic Basic Operation Functional Stabilization, Intersubjectivity, and Malfunction

This paper develops a functional reconstruction of ontologization as a fundamental epistemic operation. Ontologization is not understood as a metaphysical claim about what exists, but as a necessary stabilization process through which finite epistemic systems render a dynamic field of experience manageable. By stabilizing identity, reference, and the continuity of expectations, ontologization enables perception, memory, and action, while remaining fundamentally provisional and context-dependent.The analysis distinguishes between individual and intersubjective ontologization. Whereas individual stabilization primarily serves internal coherence, intersubjective stabilization transforms ontological commitments into shared reference points. This reduces coordination costs but simultaneously increases the costs of revision. A central contribution of the paper is the identification of social pointing as an explicit marker of this transition. Pointing establishes shared reference prior to language and addresses other agents as ontologizing epistemic systems, thereby making ontologization itself explicitly intersubjective.Against this background, the malfunction of ontologization is analyzed. This malfunction does not arise from ontological stabilization as such, but from its absolutization, when functional epistemic posits are mistaken for final descriptions of reality. Ontologization thus proves to be both a condition of possibility for cognition and a structural source of epistemic rigidity.