How do abnormal audit fees, investor protection and political influence across jurisdictions affect IPO audit quality? Evidence from Hong Kong

Purpose This paper aims to utilize the unique setting of Hong Kong to investigate whether the fee premium associated with abnormally high audit fees indicates compromised auditor independence or reflects additional, unobserved efforts that enhance audit quality. Design/methodology/approach Based on a sample of Hong Kong initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2009 to 2019, the study analyzes the association between abnormal audit fees and pre-IPO real activities manipulation (RAM). Findings The analysis reveals that auditors charging abnormally high fees are associated with reduced pre-IPO RAM, and that stronger investor protection regulations contribute to improved audit quality. Moreover, this study finds that a robust institutional environment can mitigate the effects of political influence on audit quality, which is particularly important for politically connected firms seeking cross-border listings. Originality/value Overall, auditors who charge higher fees within a strong institutional context provide superior IPO audit quality compared to their counterparts.

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Publication Details

Journal
Managerial Auditing Journal
Published
2026-01-23
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1108/maj-03-2025-4735
Primary Topic
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Type
article
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article

How do abnormal audit fees, investor protection and political influence across jurisdictions affect IPO audit quality? Evidence from Hong Kong

Weiyin Zhang, K. Hung Chan, Phyllis Lai Lan Mo
Managerial Auditing Journal
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
article

How do abnormal audit fees, investor protection and political influence across jurisdictions affect IPO audit quality? Evidence from Hong Kong

Weiyin Zhang, K. Hung Chan, Phyllis Lai Lan Mo
article en

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to utilize the unique setting of Hong Kong to investigate whether the fee premium associated with abnormally high audit fees indicates compromised auditor independence or reflects additional, unobserved efforts that enhance audit quality. Design/methodology/approach Based on a sample of Hong Kong initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2009 to 2019, the study analyzes the association between abnormal audit fees and pre-IPO real activities manipulation (RAM). Findings The analysis reveals that auditors charging abnormally high fees are associated with reduced pre-IPO RAM, and that stronger investor protection regulations contribute to improved audit quality. Moreover, this study finds that a robust institutional environment can mitigate the effects of political influence on audit quality, which is particularly important for politically connected firms seeking cross-border listings. Originality/value Overall, auditors who charge higher fees within a strong institutional context provide superior IPO audit quality compared to their counterparts.

Managerial Auditing JournalVol. 41(2)
Saint Francis University (US), Hang Seng University of Hong Kong (HK), University of Hong Kong (HK)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 81%
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
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How do abnormal audit fees, investor protection and political influence across jurisdictions affect IPO audit quality? Evidence from Hong Kong — Weiyin Zhang, K. Hung Chan, et al. · Managerial Auditing Journal (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS