Structural Libertarianism and the Veridicality of the "Up-to-Me" Experience: Psychophysical Openness, Authored Indeterminacy, and Residual Luck

This paper defends a libertarian account of free will grounded in the phenomenological structure of live decision episodes. Such episodes instantiate an i-structure, a center–periphery organization in which a focal node represents the decision situation as a whole and a periphery represents alternatives, reasons, and constraints. There is an "up-to-me" region in which the situation's identity is fixed while what will be done remains open. I argue that the best interpretation of this up-to-me phenomenology, when taken as serious evidence about agency, is global metaphysical openness: even given the total state of the world and the total laws at a time, more than one future action is nomically possible. I make this explicit through a strengthened Psychophysical Openness Thesis (POT): psychophysical laws are probabilistic and sensitive to i-structures, constraining and biasing outcomes without deterministically fixing them. I then define authored indeterminacy as underdetermined settling whose explanatory stopping point is the agent's reasons-integrating act rather than an independent chancemaker. Luck objections are addressed by conceding that global libertarianism entails irreducible bruteness and chance within the agent while arguing that responsibility does not require eliminating chance but locating irreducible settling within the agent's evaluative act.