Persistence in the Face of Deficiencies: External Interests and Centralised Decision‐Making in Cambodia’s IDPoor

This article critically examines the political forces and processes driving the persistence of the Identification of Poor Households (IDPoor) programme, the Cambodian government’s poverty targeting system and social registry. The IDPoor was established and institutionalised with strong support from donors. Despite its problems, such as significant targeting errors and how easily its data can become obsolete, the IDPoor continues to be deployed and used in multiple programmes, thus perpetuating and reproducing these problems. Based on fieldwork in Cambodia and extensive document analysis, I argue that external forces and interests represented by donors and international institutions, together with so-called “transnationalised” policy actors, are driving the continued use of the IDPoor social registry. The research found that the politics in and around the social registry is marked by centralised and top-down decision-making, excluding important voices like those living in poverty, labour groups, and programme implementers on the ground. The case of the IDPoor exhibits the dominant agendas that continue to shape Cambodian social protection.