Too Rich for Your Own Good? A Defense of Wellbeing‐Based Limitarianism

This paper explores a so far underdeveloped argument for why it is bad for people to be extremely rich. Not only is it bad, morally speaking, that there are extremely rich people in an unjust world; it is moreover the case that it is bad for the rich to have extreme wealth in an unjust world, and it is bad for them precisely because it is unjust. This view sides with limitarianism, which states that it is morally objectionable to have too much, but whereas the standard interpretation of limitarianism says that extreme wealth is morally objectionable because it is unjust, my account adds that extreme wealth is also prudentially bad because, by being unjust, it makes its possessor's life worse than it would otherwise have been. I call this wellbeing-based limitarianism.1 If wellbeing-based limitarianism turns out to be correct, it will have important implications for how we think about the extremely wealthy. It is not unfamiliar to argue that with great amounts of resources comes additional ethical responsibilities and that the rich, partly for this reason, are often a justified target for critique. But wellbeing-based limitarianism, as I will understand it, implies that being extremely rich is at least in one central respect prudentially irrational. This is certainly a surprising result, but one I am prepared to stand by, and as we shall see it can be derived from quite plausible and reasonable premises. My argument draws inspiration from eudemonistic theories of wellbeing as commonly traced back to Plato and Aristotle, but reintroduced and reinforced in recent years particularly by Ronald Dworkin's Challenge Model View of the good life (Dworkin 2000) and Bloomfield's Self-Respect-Based Theory on happiness (Bloomfield 2014). I pool these wellbeing theories under the label, The Constitutive View because they, although in slightly different ways, iterate the idea that wellbeing is constituted by fulfilling one's obligations of justice. The main thesis I defend, then, is that given that we accept this view on wellbeing, the limitarian arguments for why extreme wealth is unjust come to imply that being extremely wealthy is, at least in one sense, bad for you. Hence, we arrive at wellbeing-based limitarianism. The first section introduces the old but still unsettled dispute between The Non-Constitutive View and The Constitutive View on wellbeing. The next section gives a pro tanto argument in defense of The Constitutive View and discusses relevant limitations. In the following section, I account for the limitarian reasons why extreme wealth is unjust, and I defend The Conditional Claim, that it follows from accepting these reasons that extreme wealth is also bad for people if we accept The Constitutive View. The final section concludes. It is standard in contemporary moral and political philosophy to draw a distinction between justice and the good life so that the question of what people ought to do to fulfill their obligations of justice is separate from the question of what makes their personal lives go well. This is part of an even more general distinction between morality on the one hand, referring broadly to what we ought to do and not do as moral agents, and wellbeing understood as what is good for us on the other. The two may, of course, relate to each other in different ways. According to an act utilitarian, for example, answering the moral question, “how ought one act?” presupposes an answer to the wellbeing question, “what makes lives good?,” because utilitarianism implies answering the first question in reference to a moral rule of wellbeing maximization (e.g., maximizing pleasure or desire satisfaction). While the moral question and the wellbeing question thus both have a role to play here, they are still treated as fundamentally different issues. This is evident from the assumption (e.g., in utilitarianism) that my interest in maximizing my good interest in my often with my interest in fulfilling my moral obligations (e.g., to It is thus a that to the interest of wellbeing are and whereas moral and of are and to This to a between wellbeing and to what makes life good are from of morality as of justice the wellbeing as we play a role in of justice other the of and because what makes life good is a central part of for the of moral for wellbeing this justice be good but not good for you. Hence, we can this commonly view as It is important to The Non-Constitutive View implies that justice is not good for but it not imply that justice is bad for people I in to do what is of by but this of out to in the good to good the view between wellbeing and justice for because I it and to fulfill my obligations of justice. But what the view is that is a central part of well. and justice morality more are thus two separate and from justice on wellbeing is as to life more in a slightly different sense, by a morally or by at other that to be This is certainly a but lives more in this not to to be part of the with which the of life The Non-Constitutive View is and if it that good in sense, is not good for the being The of the view given to a general distinction in the between moral theories (e.g., and theories of wellbeing (e.g., not The Non-Constitutive View. Plato and that and in with a central part of well. The good life of how to and is the and justice with the the a and thus the good life is the life of the is that can be it its there is that not the in than and that and are not The if slightly of this is to that an presupposes or morality can the by these great as is from the I have the the distinction between The Non-Constitutive and The Constitutive View is and It that one of them be and it follows from one of them being that the other is the that the is in a old and the is but that is not one it is evident from the of Plato and that The Non-Constitutive View is about as old as The Constitutive View. that of them The Non-Constitutive it is as the relevant to their It is, for example, the by in The and by in It is for this that my of the as old is The Non-Constitutive View is as the standard view in contemporary moral and political there are important of which with and plausible theories of wellbeing on their According to these obligations of justice in different to the good life for the are Ronald Dworkin's Challenge Model View of the good life and Bloomfield's Self-Respect-Based Theory of us at these two in a more general argument for The Constitutive View. Dworkin's view that life is understood as a of its and as a life is a that that it is the and important we and that in the and that that we have the (Dworkin The Challenge Model View with what The Model of to which the of how a life is is the of this on the in the The Challenge Model View of life as of a of the of which and but which are of interest to to we in this it is to see the to Plato and and to understand why justice is in a central of a good and unjust lives go the of that is, about the resources a good life have to account of the in which resources as of the good and we I but to justice that by that a good life is a life to the of justice (Dworkin that this is not about the of justice as but about the of justice on the good of they to or the of to the at in the to the life worse lives in an unjust because the is rich, with more than justice to or with (Dworkin unjust the of an we can that the is one of of and that at one of in the the of as a is with more and than the we see that the unjust the of the of the According to The Challenge Model this is not only because they have worse for pleasure and desire than they have but also because of the the their to the of life well. we we can see that the view is in the that the also a on the lives of the of the they have their of resources and and are to personal on that but they have this in a that the moral given by life in that its well. they have is in life they have to the of life Hence, on Dworkin's personal from unjust makes life worse in a sense, by will not or In even if to the of unjust in life course, the to will only us of the are is about and there can be only one life is It is not in the as and it is not a But this not imply that is bad for in of In we as the us next a at Bloomfield's Self-Respect-Based This with Dworkin's as a of The Constitutive View but a different The argument in its is the following (Bloomfield is the is the follows from so we only the of the two premises. two reasons in of is It to that or other of are with account of it not to with of is from that there is about in the of moral think about the central of morality in life (e.g., as as people (e.g., or to accept the of for wellbeing. Hence, we have good reasons to accept is a more but in that in to respect a be to in a to how the they are for what they The of being is that it one from or the of the of life that one with being moral is for how to what they are by justice and what they are to and there is reasonable between moral for and for being moral implies that one on with for one's one other people for But this is what the to accept by being a for for example, morality in the of the the out as this that the moral for there is to respect if one not to these moral (Bloomfield that it is not that act to a in the for one in a but still have in a more general But Bloomfield's can this It not that moral is for of more than it for of one is the is that morality or for (e.g., or not is for that or for (e.g., in a and that this is important for how that or for to personal wellbeing. in a to a wellbeing, precisely because of how the is with then, can be of do not or the but will be bad for wellbeing, precisely because it be with Dworkin's Challenge Model View and Bloomfield's Self-Respect-Based Theory of happiness The View and the from Plato and the of for a to the of how and that I have thus that although The Constitutive View is in contemporary moral and political there are to defend it theories of wellbeing. The old dispute is thus still The Constitutive if an important role for the between extreme wealth and wellbeing. In the next section, I a pro tanto argument in its It is important to that I am not to the old dispute is too to for my argument to to The Constitutive View and its implications for extreme we from Aristotle, and justice is of the good this implies is that in with obligations of justice is of great for a wellbeing, understood as how that life is This both that in with justice is important for wellbeing and that the of or to wellbeing on have them (e.g., have in or wealth In of The Constitutive the following I think we have reasons to for we for to be the first to a than the that the will more and there is in personal between the can account for I The Constitutive View an important role to play here, but what other we we are to the first because we justice as a and we that this is to a in the first While I that we and we a to an unjust I think this is a The case says about to what justice is in general in the two and even if we that the of is the in the we still to the in the it be justice as a that would we the first because we that the is also the of the but this not be the The case us about for the if it to would we if that the is in for but is an of I think this it to the of under we are still to the first life and the of is still the of that if the of of moral the is, to at as an of the in how unjust we think the of the will and this is what The Constitutive View be it not be that we the first because we think that to to lives a on of its on the and that this is the for in This is a I the that the to which we in justice to but I see how can accept this that act will how good life we that this given a personal desire to moral to is to act that life worse because their an unjust but that this not the of life of the Hence, I that other moral as I think there is the that we the life of the first in least in because we think that this life is for that This gives us a pro tanto argument for The Constitutive that wellbeing is constituted by fulfilling one's obligations of justice. This is, of course, as not standard in contemporary moral and political While Dworkin's is and Challenge Model View of the good life is and to in the Bloomfield's Self-Respect-Based Theory is it is not are two general that my but which I think not us too in the that the argument in the question in the that it only in of The Constitutive View if we accept the between justice and wellbeing. of course, would be because this is precisely what The Constitutive View and what the case is to and if this is the If correct, this would be to my But as it I see to understand us the case a from the of The Non-Constitutive on or or other view that the between justice and wellbeing. would to the it would that the case is and only in of The Constitutive View because it is so that the desire is out by the assumption that the two lives If this is would if we the so that the unjust, more desire than the first But this is I still think the of the case is the that the in justice makes a for how good the life of the is, and this is to accepting The Constitutive View. for that the derived from and there is about how wellbeing. can accept this but that this not The Non-Constitutive View because if the case is to a in or pleasure of the unjust in of the life of the I that is not a argument The Non-Constitutive and I the that the case can be to in of an unjust, but more But that this that or pleasure role to play in account of wellbeing, this not The Constitutive View. It not that is, that justice is not for wellbeing, that justice is not for wellbeing. The Constitutive View can this and we still in the case to The Constitutive View. Hence, the of is still on the but have about how the in that us to the that a life is than an unjust life in the this not imply that a life is than an unjust a in which a and out of because the to the life of we not that the that of unjust but that life is than if not and that it is in this case because of the that life If we to have an to The Constitutive and it that we the from to to other But this the The that we can the of justice on the good life is by other not The Constitutive View. My argument not as as that justice is a for the good life and that other justice are for a life to be the of It thus that we can fulfilling one's obligations of justice not one's life and that under that is, justice for other central This of course, that there can be in which are that a good life is not for a given and the case to out different in of this is to of the in to a of justice in the that the they can be understood to have their lives in is and that what to draw from this is not that the would have a they with the but in they have not for The Constitutive View and it to to it is that we do not the that justice is for wellbeing. that is is that justice is a part of so that life is than unjust, other and this is the out in as the case do then, The Constitutive View. as we to the case of extreme as I do in the next section, it that can be given the case of the and the in which a good life and stand in the extremely wealthy are not in a it comes to the extremely their to imply that of to them would have to be given by what justice of The next section and discusses what the of imply for the wellbeing of the extremely if The Constitutive View is us I by the old dispute on the role of justice for wellbeing, that the dispute is still I an and pro tanto argument for The Constitutive that this is not the standard view in the contemporary If it gives us to accept that justice for wellbeing in the that how a life is is constituted by the of obligations of justice. In this section, I what this implies for the extremely wealthy. The section the recent but on limitarianism and this to The Constitutive View on wellbeing. The argument is the of limitarianism. The of argument is the following The Constitutive it be that if limitarianism how extreme wealth is unjust, limitarianism also how extreme wealth is, at least in one relevant sense, bad for the extremely wealthy. this The Conditional us at the arguments from limitarianism for and why extreme wealth is unjust. It is morally to more resources than to a It follows that there a which a of resources is morally this The a at which a given of resources turns morally objectionable In its standard limitarianism that is objectionable because of the following resources a or to a wellbeing and these resources be to fulfill obligations of other or not limitarianism an wealth is unjust because of its on important political not because of to The for limitarianism be wealth that the standard view both a and an from the of the of extreme The to the first part of the that resources do not a relevant to a wellbeing. This part to on the wellbeing but on both as desire or and theories the assumption see that the of on happiness is or for rich to extremely rich people and and of of the of the the eudemonistic theories which I have in to The Constitutive the assumption is and in of the to an account the in reference to But it that do not a eudemonistic account of wellbeing to accept The is the assumption that there an of resources that wealth that not to a wellbeing. The on the other the part of the that be to In its standard limitarianism on the and for that arguments in defense of the limitarian are to the rich The standard view that being too rich is morally objectionable because of its to the of its on or its on the political or the as a and This view to bad or moral as a of extreme wealth as the relevant of why it is morally to be too rich, and then, in The as a for why extreme wealth of relevant on the part of the extremely wealthy. This of argument to of justice as for why wealth is It also how the standard interpretation of limitarianism amounts to a of In a it given the unjust of the as it is, we have to in these are what why it is morally to be too rich. reasons of justice in of limitarianism The first is the It says that in world, for other as there are people in the with be for the of The argument is on It says that political follows a to political and and an to the from which will worse but also makes more to have with additional to the of limitarian justice on the for or these reasons the of the standard interpretation of limitarianism. extreme wealth is unjust because it of for personal which have to fulfill obligations of justice. This the that of extreme wealth is, given the as it is, an to fulfilling one's obligations of justice. this The are to the question, or more precisely and extreme wealth is bad for The question is not it is bad from an that extreme wealth is not to but it is also bad for the wealthy. an argument for the of extreme wealth on the of argument says that wealth is bad for people because resources so can too a to a a of which wealth can have a on it can it is to it can to of the it can with one's reasons for wealth is thus on not only because of its but also because of its on for the wealthy. a we can to imply that extreme wealth a for to their two moral the of justice and the to a of the good with the that the extremely wealthy certainly have a of the good and thus the to it, their for their is to be because of the following from extreme The extremely wealthy are in this sense, to not because they have the be the but because they to their of in to to a of the other moral that extreme wealth is to of justice it comes with their of the is not with the to a of the is it that their of the good is extremely wealthy people have a of moral and their on what they and good both for and amounts of wealth on and thus to a in which can is one of The to is that extreme wealth is to be in reference to plausible of justice and a for the wealthy between their of the good and their of justice. extreme wealth to extremely rich of to the that is a good an between of and plausible of This is how extreme wealth the two moral is plausible and adds an additional to the of arguments for extreme it my wellbeing-based argument in reference to how extreme wealth reasonable of justice. My defense of wellbeing-based limitarianism is thus different from but with the plausible of justice because of their for a my defense the of plausible of justice for personal wellbeing. I see it, this adds to the of limitarianism in reference to the rich as by or it an to a for people by the My argument is the The Constitutive View implies that the of wealth is bad for people it a of justice. According to limitarianism, extreme wealth a of other because it or and a to for morally relevant personal if extreme wealth a of extreme wealth is bad for It thus follows from accepting a of the standard interpretation of limitarianism and The Constitutive View that extreme wealth the wellbeing of the extremely rich. that be is that my argument to that extreme wealth is unjust and that this is because there are extreme wealth is on a of justice and in a justified This can be from the of is the view that in what we ought to we account and and If of extreme wealth be morally justified from a This be for a central role in the of and can be understood as not but an to do what is the to do in the and thus This is an but my argument is not at to the that my argument not The of The Constitutive View is that wealth is bad for if it a of which that wealth is not bad for you. limitarianism implies that extreme wealth is unjust if from fulfilling obligations of which for the of justified and of extreme are central of my I have with limitarianism that and are of which we ought to do this is a assumption because theories of justice and us to do even more than these The from us that this assumption is, of course, not in If is correct, it imply that limitarian are by obligations the far and that we ought to as as we can on (e.g., But if that is that is a it a not for my view but for limitarianism as and it the limitarian of my Hence, this not my argument as it the obligations of the of which is for The argument still the have resources that have which ought to to fulfill obligations of but only answer is it follows from The Constitutive View that these resources the interest of wellbeing. to the that it be relevant to between wealth that is and wealth that is from fulfilling obligations of This is an important because being a worse than being a resources in a and because extremely wealthy people be of the than the My argument is to this it is on of unjust It thus the that different can be bad for to different This the that wealth justice if it is under unjust or it is from fulfilling obligations of justice. In to about we would a of be that or (Dworkin and that is the of this this part of the with that it is at least a for the justice of wealth that it is and that my argument implies that if this is not the we that extreme wealth is bad for people The Constitutive the is more relevant to my as this is the one that to The Conditional The of the first only to the even The says that wealth justice from fulfilling obligations of justice. This that of the of a wealth unjust, the extremely wealthy is by obligations of justice in to which resources and there is justified to not the in this I not go what the standard interpretation of limitarianism says to this that we are about we have that the wealth in question is a of resources and it is to see how there be for not them to fulfill obligations of justice. given the of the we we can that there are The of arguments from the standard limitarian view to as of obligations that morally I thus see to the that on to wealth is a of justice. The to The Constitutive View from is If a wealth in a from or from the of in part as a of the of it is to see how this the of life wealth and to these in reference to this can be to respect for as would respect for their and to to these It is to that is, how this of fulfilling one's obligations of justice is different as a of from the life of a The is I and thus this my argument for wellbeing-based limitarianism, that it is bad for people to be extremely wealthy. It is important to that I have not for and My argument thus But it is because it that on wellbeing that are plausible The Constitutive although not standard in contemporary moral and political it follows from standard limitarianism that extreme wealth is not unjust but also bad for the extremely which have so far to This paper and wellbeing-based it is bad for people to be too wealthy. It a argument in its which the following of If are extremely if wealth a makes life If that the answer is to the wealth is on a of justice. If is a of of unjust or if on to resources the that these be to fulfill obligations of answer to this question would have to be If also that fulfilling one's obligations of justice is for wellbeing, it is to the that extreme wealth makes life worse than it would otherwise have been. The of the argument are that The Constitutive View and the limitarian arguments for extreme wealth being unjust be and I have to this the to wellbeing-based limitarianism obligations of justice can this and the between and wellbeing on I am to and The by the This or from is not The of