Quasi-fideism and epistemic incommensurability

Abstract Building on Drew Johnson’s Radical Relativist Hinge Epistemology, this paper argues that deep disagreements between theistic and naturalistic epistemic systems are best understood as instances of epistemic incommensurability. I critique Duncan Pritchard’s quasi-fideism by focusing on his claim that a content-invariant über-hinge, articulated as the commitment that we are not radically and fundamentally mistaken, can alleviate relativist concerns by supporting only a weak form of relativism. I contend that this strategy is ineffective. On theistic frameworks, the commitment that we are not globally mistaken is secured by antecedent hinges that locate cognitive reliability in divine design and providence; on naturalistic frameworks, it is secured by antecedent hinges that locate reliability in evolutionary origins and the norms of empirical inquiry. Accordingly, the commitment lacks cross-framework uniformity in role and priority, and so cannot be the universal codifying hinge Pritchard requires. Therefore, the appearance of a shared über-hinge is superficial, and quasi-fideism lacks the resources to neutralize epistemic relativism.