Legal Categorization in the Face of Skepticism: Hart, Wittgenstein and the Case of the Racial Group in Genocide

Abstract This article investigates legal categorization as a process that takes place within natural language and approaches this theme from the perspective of ordinary language philosophy. It defends the thesis that legal categorization is not a mental process but a human practice of rule-following that is situated in a world, or form of life next to other practices. To grasp what is at stake in legal categorization, the article zooms in on skepticism as a profound challenge to the very possibility of categorization. Both the legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart and the philosopher of language Ludwig Wittgenstein struggled with this challenge. To show the value of their work for legal categorization, the article looks into the specific case of the racial group as it is mentioned in the crime of genocide. Building on the understanding of legal categorization as rule-following, I will argue that one can only categorize a racial group in the concrete world, or form of life.