Memory capacity and decision preference co-shape cooperation in public goods games

• Memory amplifies cooperation only when players exhibit more greedy as defectors. • Prospect Theory and asymmetric micro-dynamics model bounded rationality in cooperation. • Strategy updating sensitivity asymmetrically modulates cooperation depending on decision preference. Empirically grounded bounded rationality decision-making, when information exchange is lacking, can be abstracted as an aspiration-driven dynamic mechanism within anonymous evolutionary games. Prospect Theory, meanwhile, provides a behavioral economics-based qualitative description for such decision-making. Therefore, we establish a micro-dynamic model based on Prospect Theory, incorporating psychological reference point dynamics, heterogeneous memory mechanisms, and asymmetric strategy updating dynamics. We systematically examine the influence of individual cognitive and behavioral parameters on the evolution of cooperation. Through Monte Carlo simulations and asynchronous update mechanisms, it reveals the complex interaction among factors such as memory capacity, decision preference, strategy updating sensitivity, synergy factor, and initial cooperation proportion. Findings indicate that the effect of memory capacity on cooperation strongly depends on decision preferences, long memory significantly promotes cooperation only when individuals exhibit more greedy as defectors. Strategy updating sensitivity can either enhance group steady-state cooperation level or compromise system stability. The synergy factor forms positive synergy with the memory mechanism by amplifying cooperation payoffs. Additionally, group steady-state cooperation levels are independent of initial conditions. These findings emphasize the condition-dependent nature of cooperation promotion. We suggest that future research should pay more attention to the important role of bounded rationality in modeling human decision-making behavior.