Urban Traffic Congestion Under the Personal Carbon Trading Mechanism—Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Private Car Owners

With the acceleration of urbanization and the continuous rise in private car ownership, urban traffic congestion has become a critical issue constraining sustainable development. As an important extension of carbon reduction policies, the personal carbon trading mechanism provides a new approach to regulate travel behavior through economic incentives. This study constructs a game model incorporating stakeholders from both government and private car owners, explores their decision-making behaviors under the personal carbon trading mechanism, and conducts simulation analysis of evolutionary paths using MATLAB 2019a. The findings reveal that choosing public transportation results from interactive strategic interactions between government and private car owners. Proactive implementation of personal carbon trading policies by the government can accelerate private car owners’ adoption of public transportation strategies. Reducing government implementation costs of personal carbon trading (PCT), increasing carbon trading costs for private cars (through higher carbon prices or lower allowances), and improving public transit comfort are key factors in achieving equilibrium between government and private car owners’ strategies. Carbon trading costs exhibit differentiated impacts on the convergence speed of both parties’ states. This research aims to provide decision-making references for governments in formulating and implementing personal carbon trading systems, as well as motivating private car owners to adopt green and environmentally friendly travel behaviors.