Social polarization and electoral incentives for Islamist de-moderation: evidence from Turkish parliamentary debates

The prospect of religious parties capturing power raises fundamental questions about the fate of secular state institutions. A prominent argument holds that participation in competitive elections incentivizes religious parties to moderate and set aside anti-systemic goals in order to maximize votes. We argue that deep-seated social polarization along the religious-secular cleavage fundamentally alters electoral incentives: when polarization is high, intensifying competition shifts the vote-maximizing strategy from centrist, broad appeals to religion-based appeals. Using a unique corpus of legislative interventions from Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), we scale legislators’ position on the religious–secular dimension. Exploiting cross-district variation in polarization and legislator-level differences in electoral vulnerability, we demonstrate that increasing exposure to electoral competition prompts representatives from polarized districts to adopt stronger Islamist appeals. Thus, the link between competitive elections and the incentives of religious party elites to accommodate secular institutional constraints is contingent upon societal polarization along the religious-secular divide.