The Separate Grounds of Competence

When a person is competent, they can exercise their autonomy rights, including waiving claims against interference by giving consent. Non-competent persons, by contrast, lack these autonomy rights, which means that others are permitted to make certain decisions for them. What grounds this gulf between the rights of competent and non-competent persons? In this paper, we present a novel account of the capacities that underlie competence. Competence comprises two distinct rights: a power to alter claims and a claim against paternalistic interference with one’s decisions. While existing accounts appear to assume that the same capacities underlie both features of agential control, we argue that they have separate grounds. The capacity that grounds the power to alter claims is the capacity to value, whereas the capacity that grounds the claim against paternalistic interference is the more substantial capacity to be responsible for one’s actions. By separating these normative grounds, we solve a problem that plagues Common Grounds views. Our Separate Grounds account can explain why and in what way the decisions of persons with marginal autonomy should be respected without sacrificing the need to protect them from harm.