Optimal cooperative service strategy led by platforms: the role of unmanned aerial vehicle delivery suppliers

Abstract The rise of low-altitude economies and the rapid development of unmanned technologies underscore the strategic role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-based delivery. This study examines a two-tier food delivery supply chain with a dominant platform (e.g., Meituan) and two types of providers: riders and UAV service suppliers. We analyze stakeholder strategies under varying UAV technological value, government subsidies, and platform cooperation models. Findings show that UAV technological value strongly influences decisions, enhancing rider orders and delivery fees while temporarily suppressing UAV orders until clear time advantages emerge. Government subsidies enhance UAV competitiveness, adjust fees, and increase profits for both platforms and UAV suppliers. Platform cooperation models and subsidies interact synergistically: revenue-sharing with subsidies is optimal under high technological value, while per-order payments with subsidies are preferred under medium value or extreme time gaps. Furthermore, riders act as flexible incumbents, differentiating when UAV technological value is high, but time advantages are limited, collaborating through revenue-sharing when UAV value is moderate, and adjusting services (e.g., night or niche delivery) when UAV subsidies are high but technological value is low, with some conditions creating a “strategy vacuum.” UAV service suppliers behave as agile entrants, favoring per-order payment with subsidy under moderate technological value and extreme time gaps, and revenue-sharing with subsidy when technological value or combined subsidy conditions support shared-risk growth. Platforms act as strategic coordinators, dynamically selecting between revenue-sharing and per-order payment with subsidy based on UAV value, time gaps, and subsidies to balance risk, secure profits, and align incentives.