Bilateral versus multilateral investment treaties: learning from success and failure

Purpose This study aims to investigate the idea that the failure of one pattern of cooperation plays a significant role in the emergence of an alternative pattern of cooperation. Specifically, whether the failure of multilateralism increased the odds of adoption for bilateralism in the investment domain. Design/methodology/approach The survival analysis models assess the impact of failure of multilateralism and the success of bilateralism on the signing of additional bilateral agreements in the investment domain using data from 1958 to 2023. Findings The results demonstrate that country dyads engaged in failed multilateral negotiations were more likely to sign Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), with positive feedback from success by signed BITs also reinforcing the pattern. Research limitations/implications In the aftermath of failed multilateral episodes, dyads engaged in the multilateral effort turn to bilateral agreements as an alternative forum for cooperation, increasing the momentum for bilateral forms of cooperation. Practical implications Rejection of limited multilateral agreements can reshape patterns of cooperation toward more bilateral agreements. Social implications Failed multilateral cooperation can help parties identify potential partners for bilateral cooperation. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to quantitatively examine the impact of failed multilateral agreements on the signing of bilateral agreements.