On the distinction between arguments and explanations

The distinction between arguments and explanations is both conceptually significant and pedagogically indispensable. Misidentifying arguments and explanations can lead to flawed evaluations and pedagogical confusion. However, while the traditional criteria (discourse function, acceptance of the statement, and acceptability of the reasons) offer some guidance, they frequently fail when applied to complex or ambiguous cases. I show that these criteria are insufficient to account for the interpretive challenges posed by real-life discourse. Instead, I propose the principle of charity as a more robust interpretive tool: we should favour the reading that best satisfies the standards of either argumentative or explanatory discourse. Although this approach will not eliminate ambiguity, it provides a consistent framework for navigating it. • Arguments and explanations often overlap in real-life discourse. • Standard criteria fail to distinguish arguments from explanations reliably. • Misidentifying explanations as arguments can lead to unfair evaluations. • The principle of charity offers a better tool for interpretive analysis.