Hub‐and‐Spoke Collusion With a Third‐Party Pricing Algorithm

ABSTRACT A data analytics company delivers an efficiency by supplying a pricing algorithm that allows prices to more effectively respond to demand variation. In this setting, I consider a new form of hub‐and‐spoke collusion: A data analytics company (hub) coordinates the prices of competitors (spokes) through its pricing algorithm. A novel finding is that the data analytics company's efficiency is a facilitating factor for collusion; a rise in this efficiency increases the supracompetitive markup and the incremental profit from collusion. Thus, markets in which a third party's services are solidly grounded in efficiency still warrant scrutiny by competition authorities because they are more prone to the emergence of collusion and anticompetitive harm.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Industrial Economics
Published
2026-01-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70017
Primary Topic
Merger and Competition Analysis
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Hub‐and‐Spoke Collusion With a Third‐Party Pricing Algorithm

Joseph E. Harrington
Journal of Industrial Economics
Merger and Competition Analysis
article

Hub‐and‐Spoke Collusion With a Third‐Party Pricing Algorithm

Joseph E. Harrington
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT A data analytics company delivers an efficiency by supplying a pricing algorithm that allows prices to more effectively respond to demand variation. In this setting, I consider a new form of hub‐and‐spoke collusion: A data analytics company (hub) coordinates the prices of competitors (spokes) through its pricing algorithm. A novel finding is that the data analytics company's efficiency is a facilitating factor for collusion; a rise in this efficiency increases the supracompetitive markup and the incremental profit from collusion. Thus, markets in which a third party's services are solidly grounded in efficiency still warrant scrutiny by competition authorities because they are more prone to the emergence of collusion and anticompetitive harm.

Journal of Industrial Economics
University of Pennsylvania (US)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Universität Wien, Universitat de Barcelona, Universität Mannheim
Openalex Percentile: Top 92%
Merger and Competition Analysis
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