Nietzsche as Moderate Value Pluralist

Abstract This paper attempts to resolve an exegetical tension in the debate on Nietzsche’s conception of value by arguing the following claims. First, he is a kind of moderate pluralist about value who uses the “thriving/degeneration of life” or “increase/decrease in power” as a quantitative covering value for a plurality of drives with qualitatively different and irreducible objects of value. Second, he has a determinate evaluative scheme for “revaluating” or “rank ordering” the plurality of drives by differentiating between their contribution to the covering value in two ways. One way is by differentiating between a plurality of “instinctive” drives for objects with intrinsic/necessary value and a plurality of “non-instinctive” drives for objects with extrinsic/possible value. Another way is by differentiating between the plurality of drives in instances of conflict or comparison between their objects of value. The paper justifies the exegetical validity of this scheme by demonstrating its ability to reconcile some of Nietzsche’s seemingly paradoxical evaluative remarks pertaining to the truth/falsity of morality and the value of the truth/falsity for morality, ascetic ideals as both an affirmation and negation of life, and all values as both expressing and lacking the will to power.