When Transparency Becomes Immoral: The Ethical Limits of Radical Disclosure in Organizations

Transparency often sits in organisations as an ethical ideal. Transparency is often proposed as a promise of responsibility and a sign of honesty. Nevertheless, that trust is compromised by both the modern tendency of radical disclosure, which is enhanced by digital surveillance and algorithmic governance (Bernstein, 2012; Fung et al., 2007; Xiang et al., 2025). The following paper presents both a conceptual and normative thesis according to which transparency as such is not ethical (Bowie, 2017); its moral value depends on the interpretation of disclosure. Transparency carries ethical force only when it respects human dignity and sustains moral agency at work. Building on a dignity-based ethical lens rooted in Kantian moral theory and connected to business ethics scholarship on respect for individuals, I argue that transparency becomes immoral when it coerces visibility, converts people into instruments for control or substitutes being seen for being responsible (Bowie, 2017; Kant, 1785/1996). I then specify three boundary conditions that distinguish ethically justified transparency from morally corrosive transparency: voluntary disclosure, the preservation of practical discretion, and alignment between disclosure and accountability duties. The paper contributes to organisational and business ethics theory by shifting the debate from how to implement transparency to when it should be ethically refused, even when it is efficient or legally permissible. By doing so, it offers a principled vocabulary for evaluating radical disclosure in work systems and clarifies how dignity at work is threatened not only by secrecy and surveillance but also by moralised demands for constant openness (Gibson et al., 2023).