Poseidon(2)b

We present Poseidonb and Poseidon2b, natural variants of Poseidon and Poseidon2, respectively, defined over binary extension fields with a target security level of 128 bits. They are specifically designed to inherit many of the circuit-friendly properties of their prime field version, and to be used together with binary extension field proving systems such as Binius. Benchmarking demonstrates the merits in proof size, proving time, and especially verification time, in comparison to traditional hash functions and other binary circuit-friendly hash functions such as Vision-32b and Anemoi. Due to the close similarity to their prime field counterparts, many existing cryptanalytic results directly carry over to Poseidonb and Poseidon2b. Nevertheless, we revisit the security analysis to incorporate recent advances in cryptanalysis and to account for attack vectors that do not arise in the prime field setting. In particular, we focus on algebraic cryptanalysis and subspace trails, techniques that resulted in attacks on initial versions of Poseidon defined over binary extension fields. Our complexity estimates are based on the ideal degree, now increasingly adopted as a standard measure in algebraic cryptanalysis

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Publication Details

Journal
IACR Communications in Cryptology
Published
2026-01-08
DOI
https://doi.org/10.62056/a66ce0zn4
Primary Topic
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Poseidon(2)b

Dmitry Khovratovich, Christian Rechberger, Markus Schofnegger, Lorenzo Grassi et al.
IACR Communications in Cryptology
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
article

Poseidon(2)b

Dmitry Khovratovich, Christian Rechberger, Markus Schofnegger, Lorenzo Grassi, Zhuo WU, Katharina Koschatko, Verena Schröppel
article en

Abstract

We present Poseidonb and Poseidon2b, natural variants of Poseidon and Poseidon2, respectively, defined over binary extension fields with a target security level of 128 bits. They are specifically designed to inherit many of the circuit-friendly properties of their prime field version, and to be used together with binary extension field proving systems such as Binius. Benchmarking demonstrates the merits in proof size, proving time, and especially verification time, in comparison to traditional hash functions and other binary circuit-friendly hash functions such as Vision-32b and Anemoi. Due to the close similarity to their prime field counterparts, many existing cryptanalytic results directly carry over to Poseidonb and Poseidon2b. Nevertheless, we revisit the security analysis to incorporate recent advances in cryptanalysis and to account for attack vectors that do not arise in the prime field setting. In particular, we focus on algebraic cryptanalysis and subspace trails, techniques that resulted in attacks on initial versions of Poseidon defined over binary extension fields. Our complexity estimates are based on the ideal degree, now increasingly adopted as a standard measure in algebraic cryptanalysis

IACR Communications in CryptologyVol. 2(4)
Graz University of Technology (AT), State Key Laboratory of Cryptology (CN), LEK Consulting (United States) (US), ABS Consulting (United States) (US), Facing Our Risk of Cancer Empowered (US), Hospital del Niño (PA), Institute of Information Engineering (CN), University of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN), Eindhoven University of Technology (NL)
European Commission
Openalex Percentile: Top 93%
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
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Poseidon(2)b — Dmitry Khovratovich, Christian Rechberger, et al. · IACR Communications in Cryptology (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS