The Inconsistency and Rhetorical Function of John Hick’s Religious Pluralism

Abstract In this paper I argue that although John Hick interprets both theistic and impersonal conceptions of the Absolute as equivalent by emphasising the unknowability of the Absolute he implicitly understands it as actually impersonal. The inconsistency in Hick’s thought lies in his use of a pluralistic framework rooted in theistic origins while infusing it with non-theistic worldview content. I argue that only on the basis of theistic assumptions does the diversity of religions present a fundamental problem that requires the kind of complex theory that Hick develops. Since Hick does not really believe in a theistic Absolute his theory of religious pluralism ultimately lacks the need for formulation. In the context of Hick’s personal mystical experience of the Absolute as impersonal his theory of religious pluralism seems to have functioned as a rhetorical tool for indirectly expressing his theological belief in the impersonal Absolute. The direct expression of this belief would have required – within the constraints of Western academic discourse which was Hick’s primary platform for expression and which particularly in Britain is predominantly rationalistic and agnostic-atheistic – extremely challenging arguments.