Dictionaries in Legal Interpretation as a Time-Sensitive Argument, or on Atemporal and Temporal Justifications

Abstract Time is often an overlooked dimension in legal interpretation. Its passage affects boththe content and the weight of interpretative arguments, making it essential for judges to carefully select the interpretive moment—the point in time to which the interpretation must correspond (e.g., the moment of the crime in criminal law). To investigate judicial awareness of the temporal sensitivity of interpretive arguments, we focus on the dictionary argument, which is inherently time-sensitive. After analyzing the importanceof selecting appropriate dictionaries, we examined decisions of Polish courts that, in our view, reflect broader trends in contemporary judicial interpretation. The use of dictionaries in the interpretation of law is very widespread, and dictionaries themselves are interpretative tools with high temporal sensitivity, which is rarely recognised by courts. Our findings distinguish between atemporal and temporal styles of judicial justification: the former disregards the passage of time, while the latter acknowledges its significance. Although justification need not always be temporal, the dominance of atemporal reasoning may indicate a lack of time awareness among judges.