Russia’s Changes in the Conduct of War Based on Lessons from Ukraine: Adapting Technology, Force Structures, and the Defence Industry

The article was first published in the US Army Journal Military Review:https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2025/Lessons-from-Ukraine/ Russia has demonstrated a remarkable ability to quickly learn and innovate despite suffering substantial losses in Ukraine. This makes Russia a challenging enemy that defies previous assumptions about its military strengths. This article argues that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) has successfully adapted their conduct of war by integrating new technologies and tactics, thereby enhancing their combat effectiveness against the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). By focusing on drone and electronic warfare (EW), this adaptation has led to demonstrable shifts in battlefield dynamics and has boosted operational capabilities, presenting a serious challenge to traditional NATO defense strategies. Using the military innovations theory developed by Michael C. Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, this article examines how the AFRF has adapted its conduct of war based on lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine, particularly where the AFRF has demonstrated significant technological and tactical advancements [1]. Horowitz and Pindyck’s theory outlines the stages of invention, incubation, and implementation, which are applied to analyze three specific case studies: the use of Iranian one-way attack (OWA) Shahed drones, first-person-view (FPV) drones, and lightweight EW systems. Of note, this article does not explore other military innovations like glide aviation bombs or reconnaissance-strike complexes, as their examination would exceed the scope of this article. This analysis shows the AFRF’s ability to innovate, challenging perceptions of its rigidity and resistance to change. Military innovations in the use of Shahed drones, FPV drones, and counter-unmanned aerial vehicles (C-UAV) while also using lightweight EW systems illustrate Russia’s capacity to institutionalize innovation within its doctrine, force structures, and the military-industrial complex. These changes are a potential threat to the Baltic States and their NATO allies, given its geographical proximity. It highlights the urgent need to address these challenges to prepare for future wars.