Research on Design of Incentive Mechanism for Cross‐Border Payment Data Sharing Based on Differential Privacy

ABSTRACT In the context of the rapid development of the global digital economy, cross‐border payments are a key link connecting different financial markets, and their data sharing efficiency directly affects the accuracy and security of payments and settlements. However, traditional cross‐border payment data sharing faces dual challenges: on the one hand, the direct sharing of sensitive transaction data can easily lead to the risk of privacy leakage. According to statistics, financial losses caused by data leakage in the global cross‐border payment field will exceed US $12 billion in 2023; On the other hand, due to the high sharing cost and opaque income distribution of participating institutions, there is a widespread lack of incentives of “unwilling to share and afraid to share,” resulting in about 40% of potentially valid data being underutilized. Given the above pain points, this study proposes an incentive mechanism for cross‐border payment data sharing based on differential privacy. By constructing a ternary model of “privacy protection‐contribution quantification‐dynamic reward,” differential privacy technology is used to k‐anonymize the original data, Laplacian noise addition and other processing to reduce the risk of privacy leakage to ε ≤ 0.5 while ensuring data availability; Combined with blockchain technology, the nontamperable record of contribution value is realized, and a revenue distribution algorithm based on Shapley value is designed to dynamically allocate rewards according to the organization's data quality, sharing frequency and privacy protection strength. Simulating the participation of 100, 500, and 1000 cross‐border payment institutions in the experiment shows that when the participation scale is expanded to 500, the data sharing rate increases from 32% of the traditional mechanism to 78%, and the incidence of privacy leakage incidents decreases by 65%; In a complex network of 1000 institutions, sharing latency was shortened by 40% and participant satisfaction reached 89%. The results show that this mechanism not only effectively protects privacy but also significantly improves data sharing efficiency and participation enthusiasm providing a feasible solution for the efficient circulation of cross‐border payment data elements.