Asymmetric racial homophily but no gender or age effects on cooperation and reputation formation in public goods dilemmas

Abstract Group heterogeneity is often thought to hinder cooperation and public goods provision, but it is unclear which differences matter most or if all diversity reduces cooperation. This study examines whether two core mechanisms of cooperation—reputation and reciprocity—operate differently in groups with varying gender, race and age compositions. Across three studies (N = 875) using the public goods game, we independently assessed how group diversity affects reputation and reciprocity in cooperative settings. Contrary to expectations, group composition (heterogeneous versus homogeneous) did not significantly alter reputation perceptions. While reciprocity differences emerged, they were due to varying leniency towards non-cooperators rather than a clear in-group bias, except in race, where White participants showed greater cooperation with similar cooperative partners over Black ones. Our findings suggest that, while similarity may influence initial group dynamics, its impact on reputation and cooperation wanes over time.

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Publication Details

Journal
Royal Society Open Science
Published
2026-01-07
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.250765
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Asymmetric racial homophily but no gender or age effects on cooperation and reputation formation in public goods dilemmas

Waldir M. Sampaio, Ana Luísa Freitas, Paulo S. Boggio, Lorenzo Fantazzini Reichter et al.
Royal Society Open Science
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

Asymmetric racial homophily but no gender or age effects on cooperation and reputation formation in public goods dilemmas

Waldir M. Sampaio, Ana Luísa Freitas, Paulo S. Boggio, Lorenzo Fantazzini Reichter, Gabriel Tadashi M. dos Santos
article en

Abstract

Abstract Group heterogeneity is often thought to hinder cooperation and public goods provision, but it is unclear which differences matter most or if all diversity reduces cooperation. This study examines whether two core mechanisms of cooperation—reputation and reciprocity—operate differently in groups with varying gender, race and age compositions. Across three studies (N = 875) using the public goods game, we independently assessed how group diversity affects reputation and reciprocity in cooperative settings. Contrary to expectations, group composition (heterogeneous versus homogeneous) did not significantly alter reputation perceptions. While reciprocity differences emerged, they were due to varying leniency towards non-cooperators rather than a clear in-group bias, except in race, where White participants showed greater cooperation with similar cooperative partners over Black ones. Our findings suggest that, while similarity may influence initial group dynamics, its impact on reputation and cooperation wanes over time.

Royal Society Open ScienceVol. 13(1)
Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (BR), National Institute of Science and Technology (ID)
Gender equality
Openalex Percentile: Top 96%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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Asymmetric racial homophily but no gender or age effects on cooperation and reputation formation in public goods dilemmas — Waldir M. Sampaio, Ana Luísa Freitas, et al. · Royal Society Open Science (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS