PUF-Based Tamper Protection for Global Satellite Navigation
High-assurance systems deployed in unprotected, or even hostile, environments require to preserve a trusted state throughout the entire life cycle of the system to protect the secrets stored in the device. They need to withstand advanced physical attacks on system level and to prevent attacks on individual components or their communication. In this work, we present an integrated system with several improvements of a PUF-based tamper protection technology and a demonstrator that integrates a wrapped foil enhanced for higher flexibility and an area-optimized discrete measurement circuit to create a secure compartment that can protect a payload in a GNSS application scenario. This not only validates the applicability of the technology but also enables transfer to other future applications.
Authors
- Matthias Hiller (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1238-1114)
- Alexander Rügamer (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5927-4685)
- Valentin Huber
- Fabian Benschuh
- Alaa Abdellah
- Alexander Sedlmaier
Institutions
- Fraunhofer Center for Applied Research on Supply Chain Services (DE)
- Fraunhofer Research Institution for Microsystems and Solid State Technologies (DE)
- Fraunhofer Institute for Applied and Integrated Security (DE)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-10-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/paine66113.2025.11320223
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00