Secure and reliable cooperative spectrum sensing in the presence of massive probabilistic Byzantine attacks

In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) improves spectrum sensing performance in radio environments subject to fading and shadowing. However, when some secondary users (SUs) share falsified sensing information in CSS through a falsification attack on sensing data (spectrum sensing data falsification attack, SSDF), the sensing performance degrades significantly. This document proposes a new probabilistic SSDF attack model and a new defence strategy based on a robust identification and suppression mechanism against massive SSDF attacks. Simulation results obtained under various massive probabilistic SSDF attack scenarios show that the detection performance of the proposed defence scheme outperforms that of the weighted sequential probability ratio test (WSPRT), sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), and Majority fusion techniques with which comparisons have been made. The proposed defence scheme guarantees a near-zero probability of error whatever the number of attackers and whatever the SSDF attack strategy, which is not the case for WSPRT, SPRT, and Majority rule.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Communication Networks and Distributed Systems
Published
2026-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1504/ijcnds.2026.150915
Primary Topic
Cognitive Radio Networks and Spectrum Sensing
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Secure and reliable cooperative spectrum sensing in the presence of massive probabilistic Byzantine attacks

A. El Alaoui, Sara Bakkali, Flavien Donkeng Zemo
International Journal of Communication Networks and Distributed Systems
Cognitive Radio Networks and Spectrum Sensing
article

Secure and reliable cooperative spectrum sensing in the presence of massive probabilistic Byzantine attacks

A. El Alaoui, Sara Bakkali, Flavien Donkeng Zemo
article en

Abstract

In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) improves spectrum sensing performance in radio environments subject to fading and shadowing. However, when some secondary users (SUs) share falsified sensing information in CSS through a falsification attack on sensing data (spectrum sensing data falsification attack, SSDF), the sensing performance degrades significantly. This document proposes a new probabilistic SSDF attack model and a new defence strategy based on a robust identification and suppression mechanism against massive SSDF attacks. Simulation results obtained under various massive probabilistic SSDF attack scenarios show that the detection performance of the proposed defence scheme outperforms that of the weighted sequential probability ratio test (WSPRT), sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), and Majority fusion techniques with which comparisons have been made. The proposed defence scheme guarantees a near-zero probability of error whatever the number of attackers and whatever the SSDF attack strategy, which is not the case for WSPRT, SPRT, and Majority rule.

International Journal of Communication Networks and Distributed SystemsVol. 32(1)
Euro-Mediterranean University of Fes (MA)
Openalex Percentile: Top 96%
Cognitive Radio Networks and Spectrum Sensing
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Secure and reliable cooperative spectrum sensing in the presence of massive probabilistic Byzantine attacks — A. El Alaoui, Sara Bakkali, et al. · International Journal of Communication Networks and Distributed Systems (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS