Defining “Conspiracy Theory” Without Begging the Question: A Roadmap

Abstract Generalism about conspiracy theories (CTs) is the view that CTs, as a class, are epistemically flawed. Particularists argue that each CT must be judged individually on its evidence. Both sides accuse each other of circular reasoning—of defining the term “CT” in ways that make their conclusions trivially true. This paper proposes a way out of this deadlock. In section (1), we argue that the debate is path-dependent: resolving the impasse requires addressing key questions in the right order, starting with whether “CT” is a pejorative term in ordinary usage. Section (2) answers in the affirmative and defends a refined version of the deficiency view: “CT” works as a thick epistemic term. Section (3) asks whether this ordinary usage should be revised. We argue that it should not: the particularist’s main worry that generalism encourages the offhand dismissal of all conspiracy explanations rests on a misconception of generalism, while particularists’ other legitimate concerns can be addressed without redefining the term. We then take a conciliatory turn towards the particularist. For one, there is a broadly particularist challenge that calls for a further refinement of the deficiency view: it has proven difficult to pinpoint a single deficiency common to all CTs. Building on a recent proposal by Boudry and Napolitano, we argue in section (4) that generalists need not maintain that all CTs share the same defect. Rather, CTs may exhibit overlapping subsets of a broader cluster of epistemic shortcomings—the family resemblance view of CTs. We also show that the particularist’s core demand for case-by-case investigations of conspiracy hypotheses remains legitimate and that generalism and particularism turn out to be compatible. On reasonable construals that distill each view to its core, both emerge as true.