Why Do Family Firms Hold Cash? Agency Conflicts and Valuation Perspectives

This study aims to examine whether family firms differ from nonfamily firms in their propensity to save cash, particularly in response to new investment opportunities, and to assess how investors value the cash holdings of family versus nonfamily firms in light of potential agency concerns. The study uses the context of Jordan—a small emerging market characterized by weak investor protection and the dominance of family-managed firms, a setting that exacerbates principal–principal conflicts. Employing treatment effects and propensity score matching estimation techniques to address the endogeneity between family control and firm cash holdings, this study finds that family enterprises maintain significantly higher cash reserves than their nonfamily counterparts. Moreover, the analysis finds that family firms do not exhibit a significantly greater propensity to save cash in response to new investment opportunities, implying that financial flexibility concerns are not significantly different between family and nonfamily firms. However, the results further demonstrate that investors assign a higher valuation to cash held by nonfamily firms, suggesting that investors associate family control with potential agency conflicts regarding the deployment of cash reserves.