Epistemic reparations and disability

Abstract Epistemic reparations are argued to be deserved by those wronged by gross injustices and violations, to provide redress for epistemic wrongs incurred by victims and survivors. I apply epistemic reparations and Lackey’s (2022, 2025) “right to be known” to disability injustice. This novel exploration makes three contributions. First, that given widespread historical and contemporary injustice and violations incurred by disabled people – material and epistemic – theoretical resources such as Lackey’s, which aim to account for epistemic wrongs and ameliorate injustice, should have significant value for the pursuit of disability justice. As I demonstrate, this application permits identification of ways in which disabled people are epistemically wronged, and how the concept of disability can be used to wrong, or malign, others. Second, as disability intersects with other populations, taking disability into consideration here serves others contexts of epistemic reparations. Third, despite the potential value of, and need for, epistemic reparations for disability justice, I submit that this will likely be forestalled without acknowledging and addressing the neglect of disability – particularly intellectual disability – in social epistemological theorising. This neglect incurs the cost of some existing theories in the domain being unable to account for the ways in which some disabled people – those with intellectual disability – can be epistemically wronged, or even considered knowers and agents. Through applying Lackey’s framework of epistemic duties, I demonstrate that ameliorating this neglect is epistemically reparative work in itself, as well as being required to realise the value of epistemic reparations for those wronged due to disability status.