Platform Data Transaction and Government Regulation Under Users’ Personal Data Use Authorization Mechanism

With the significant increase in users’ privacy awareness and strict regulatory response, user privacy protection faces a dilemma between platform operational flexibility and commercial potential. The personal data use authorization has become an important mechanism influencing platform data transactions and government regulation, thereby shaping the development trajectory of the data trading market. Previous literature has yet to fully elucidate the complex interactions and evolutionary equilibrium strategies among the parties involved in data transactions. This study builds an evolutionary game model involving three parties—users, platforms, and the government—to explore the evolutionary equilibrium of users’ personal data use authorization strategy, platforms’ data trading strategy, and the government’s regulatory strategy. The findings reveal that: (1) User authorization does not always promote platform data transactions. Under the personal data use authorization mechanism, user authorization facilitates platform data transactions only when either the data transaction price is low and the value of user behavioral data exceeds a certain threshold, or the data transaction price is high and the value of user behavioral data falls within a specific range. (2) User authorization is not a sufficient condition for the government to impose strict regulatory measures on platform data transactions. When the regulatory cost is low, the government’s strict regulatory strategy is influenced by both the data transaction price and the value of user behavioral data. Specifically, under low-price–medium-value or high-price–high-value conditions, the government tends to strictly regulate platform data transactions when users do not authorize the use of personal data. Conversely, under low-price–high-value or high-price–medium-value conditions, the government is more inclined to enforce strict regulation when users authorize the use of personal data. This study contributes to evaluating the role of the personal data use authorization mechanism, offering valuable insights to platforms and the government on data transactions and regulation.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research
Published
2026-01-03
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer21010012
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Platform Data Transaction and Government Regulation Under Users’ Personal Data Use Authorization Mechanism

Zhiwei Chen, Z. Li, Jing Li, Miao Qi
Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research
Digital Platforms and Economics
article

Platform Data Transaction and Government Regulation Under Users’ Personal Data Use Authorization Mechanism

Zhiwei Chen, Z. Li, Jing Li, Miao Qi
article en

Abstract

With the significant increase in users’ privacy awareness and strict regulatory response, user privacy protection faces a dilemma between platform operational flexibility and commercial potential. The personal data use authorization has become an important mechanism influencing platform data transactions and government regulation, thereby shaping the development trajectory of the data trading market. Previous literature has yet to fully elucidate the complex interactions and evolutionary equilibrium strategies among the parties involved in data transactions. This study builds an evolutionary game model involving three parties—users, platforms, and the government—to explore the evolutionary equilibrium of users’ personal data use authorization strategy, platforms’ data trading strategy, and the government’s regulatory strategy. The findings reveal that: (1) User authorization does not always promote platform data transactions. Under the personal data use authorization mechanism, user authorization facilitates platform data transactions only when either the data transaction price is low and the value of user behavioral data exceeds a certain threshold, or the data transaction price is high and the value of user behavioral data falls within a specific range. (2) User authorization is not a sufficient condition for the government to impose strict regulatory measures on platform data transactions. When the regulatory cost is low, the government’s strict regulatory strategy is influenced by both the data transaction price and the value of user behavioral data. Specifically, under low-price–medium-value or high-price–high-value conditions, the government tends to strictly regulate platform data transactions when users do not authorize the use of personal data. Conversely, under low-price–high-value or high-price–medium-value conditions, the government is more inclined to enforce strict regulation when users authorize the use of personal data. This study contributes to evaluating the role of the personal data use authorization mechanism, offering valuable insights to platforms and the government on data transactions and regulation.

Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce researchVol. 21(1)
Jiangsu University (CN)
National Social Science Fund of China
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 97%
Digital Platforms and Economics
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