An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Dual-Channel Encroachment and Green Fulfillment in Platform-Based Supply Chains

Growing climate concerns and rising consumer awareness of sustainability have reshaped strategic interactions in platform-based supply chains. This study examines how a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform make channel and fulfillment decisions under cap-and-trade regulation. The manufacturer chooses between non-encroachment and agency encroachment, while the platform decides between conventional and sustainable fulfillment. To capture the dynamic adaptation of boundedly rational agents, we develop an evolutionary game model (EGT) and characterize the evolutionary stable strategies. The findings indicate the following: (1) Platform investment in sustainable fulfillment exerts a strategic stabilizer effect, effectively protecting the reselling channel by reducing the manufacturer’s incentive to encroach even under moderate commission rates; (2) there exists a regulatory substitution effect between carbon pricing and commissions, where high carbon prices force manufacturers to encroach for survival, while low commissions encourage encroachment for profit; (3) consumer sensitivity exhibits a critical threshold behavior, where a synchronized transition to joint sustainability is impossible unless awareness exceeds a specific tipping point. Managerial insights suggest that platforms should view green logistics as a retention strategy to prevent channel fragmentation, while policymakers must coordinate carbon taxation with consumer awareness campaigns to avoid locking the system into non-green equilibria.