Epistemic Stances: Local vs. Global, Reducible vs. Irreducible

This paper addresses a gap in the scientonomic ontology by clarifying the notion of epistemic stance and articulating two orthogonal distinctions among epistemic stances: global vs. local, and reducible vs. irreducible. The paper first proposes cross-definitions of epistemic stance and epistemic element, completing the definitional loop among the basic scientonomic terms. It then introduces the distinction between global epistemic stances, understood as stances available to all epistemic agents transhistorically, and local epistemic stances, which are historically or agent specific. A second distinction is drawn between stances reducible to more fundamental stances (most notably theory acceptance) and those that are irreducible. These distinctions are illustrated through a classification of familiar scientonomic stances, such as theory acceptance, question acceptance, norm employment, and compatibility, as well as a discussion of such local stances as heresy, dogma, and scientificity. It then examines the conditions under which local epistemic stances become available to agents and deduces the local stance availability theorem, according to which the availability of a local stance depends on the derivability of permissibility or desirability norms from an agent’s mosaic. Finally, the dynamics of taking stances reducible to theory acceptance is explained by means of a theorem deduced from the law of theory acceptance. Several implications for future theoretical and observational scientonomic research are identified.