Adversarial Perturbations for Defeating Cryptographic Algorithm Identification

Recent advances in machine learning have enabled highly effective ciphertext-based cryptographic algorithm identification, posing a potential threat to encrypted communication. Inspired by adversarial example techniques, we present CSPM (Class-Specific Perturbation Mask Generation), a novel adversarial-defense framework that enhances ciphertext unidentifiability through misleading machine-learning-based cipher classifiers. CPSM constructs lightweight, reversible bit-level perturbations that alter statistical ciphertext features without affecting legitimate decryption. The method leverages class prototypes to capture representative bit-distribution patterns for each cryptographic algorithm and integrates two complementary mechanisms—mimicry-based perturbing, which steers ciphertexts toward similar cipher classes, and distortion-based perturbing, which disrupts distinctive statistical traits—through a ranking-based greedy search. Extensive experiments on seven widely used cryptographic algorithms and fifteen NIST statistical feature configurations demonstrate that CSPM consistently reduces algorithm-identification accuracy by over 25%. These results confirm that perturbation position selection, rather than magnitude, dominates attack efficacy. CSPM provides a practical defense mechanism, offering a new perspective for safeguarding encrypted communications against statistical and machine-learning-based traffic analysis.