Security of Practical Quantum Key Distribution with Weak‐Randomness Model

ABSTRACT Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables long‐distance secret keys transmission with information‐theoretic security. However, weak‐randomness obviously limits the security of practical QKD systems. This may leak the key information by considering the imperfect devices. In this work, we proposed a practical security analysis model that simultaneously considers the bit‐weak‐randomness and the basis‐weak‐randomness parameters, which we refer to as the weak‐randomness model. First, we establish a novel bit‐weak‐randomness model based on the virtual mutually unbiased bases method. Subsequently, under the framework of information‐theoretic security proof, we proposed a comprehensive weak‐randomness model by incorporating the basis‐weak‐randomness model. Then, we characterize the relationship between typical quantum attacking strategies and weak‐randomness parameters. Based on our proposed weak‐randomness model, we perform a security analysis against these attacks. Finally, we perform numerical simulations of the weak‐randomness model based on the advantage distillation method, considering both single photon sources and weak coherent sources. Our results can provide a model capable of characterizing security parameters to simultaneously account for the impacts of both imperfect devices and quantum hacking. This enables a unified standard for evaluating the security levels of practical QKD systems and offers a theoretical foundation for QKD system testing and assessment.