Compounds and Raiders: A Strategic Model of Self‐Protection in the End Times

This paper examines the rationality of elite bunker building as a response to anticipated societal collapse. Indeed, the phenomenon of "prepping" for "the Event" can be framed as self-insurance and relies on a transactional view of humanity, if one is to ensure the control of a compound and fight off potential assailants. We draw on economic decision modeling to analyze how the necessity of internal control by the leader, resentment, or the perception of potential loot by outsiders interact with fortification strategies. We introduce a "Machiavelli index" to represent hostility and show that excessive investment in defense can be counterproductive and provoke attack. Maximum bunkerization may not be optimal compared to a degree of cooperation, redistribution, and efforts to reduce perceived inequality. Survival in the end times may depend less on walls and more on legitimacy, reciprocity, and strategic restraint.