Hegelian Constitutivism

Abstract Constitutivism is the general view that some class of normative standards can be derived from the constitutive features of agency. The constitutivist claims that all persons, as agents, are bound by certain norms simply because they are agents. The view aims to counter sceptical worries about the bindingness of norms, moral or otherwise. I articulate a Hegelian version of constitutivism, according to which adherence to norms of recognition is both necessary to know what one has done in the past and to guide future action. A person cannot have a coherent conception of themselves as an agent if they do not abide by recognitive norms. Many existing versions of constitutivism promise too much. It is unlikely that we can derive all of morality from the constitutive features of agency. Hegel, however, allows us to see that the foundations of morality can be gleaned from the nature of action.