Military Insubordination and International Coercion

Do acts of military insubordination affect foreign aggression? We argue that mutiny makes a state more vulnerable to international coercion. Mutinies help foreign adversaries differentiate weak targets from strong ones by “affecting” and “revealing” states’ war-fighting costs and resolve. They disrupt the military command structure, thereby increasing the costs of organizing a well-coordinated defense against foreign threats. They also make deterrence posturing less effective by signaling a weakened resolve that sets the stage for the mutiny. Using time-series-cross-sectional data from 1945 to 2014, we show that mutiny (a) increases the likelihood of the state being targeted in a militarized interstate dispute, and (b) decreases the likelihood of its resistance once the MID is initiated. The paper advances our understanding of how civil-military relations affect states’ external threat environment. It also underscores the dynamic role of private information in international conflict processes.