Evolutionary game analysis of various subjects regarding China’s carbon reduction obligation in the framework of “dual-carbon” targets

This study designs an Evolutionary Game Model (EGM) to analyze how Carbon Reduction (CR) responsibilities are shared between government entities, enterprises, and citizens during China’s Carbon Peaking (CP) and Carbon Neutrality (CN) targets. The research builds a three-player EGM to study how China manages CR obligations across its climate policy framework. The model reproduces the interactions between government agencies, businesses, and citizens while incorporating factors such as government intervention, corporate approaches, and public participation. The game system achieves its optimal outcome through the positive benefits of resident participation in CR combined with balanced costs or business advantages. Research findings show that organizations without government monitoring can adopt Low-Carbon Production (LCP) techniques while citizens become active participants in the development of Low-Carbon Societies (LCS). The research demonstrates that the government should broaden its scope from just economic regulation costs to take an active part in encouraging public involvement and responsibility in CR initiatives. The study results establish vital knowledge that helps policymakers create practical responsibility-sharing systems that unite governmental agencies with businesses and communities to achieve CR objectives for national and worldwide climate strategies.