Coordination by sunspots: Letter is mightier than colour
We set up an experiment to test whether players use a payoff-irrelevant public message (BLUE or RED) as a possible sunspot to coordinate in a Battle of the Sexes game in which the strategies are labelled X and Y. We find that players do not play a sunspot equilibrium, instead learn to coordinate on a particular focal point (strategy X) in the game, even in the presence of the public signal (colour) and stick to this focal point, after the public signal is withdrawn.
Authors
- Indrajit Ray (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144)
- Michalis Drouvelis (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0157-5274)
- John Bone
- Konstantinos Georgalos
Publication Details
- Journal
- ORCA Online Research @Cardiff (Cardiff University)
- Published
- 2025-12-31
- Primary Topic
- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00