When are leaders blamed for bad events that never happened? Partisanship and close counterfactual catastrophes

How much blame do leaders deserve for counterfactual catastrophes : disasters that could have occurred under their watch but never did? We propose that when people oppose (vs. support) a leader, they are more likely to answer this question by considering how close the catastrophe came to occurring. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 1927), U.S. participants assigned greater blame for counterfactual catastrophes (e.g., an imagined nuclear attack) to Presidents Trump and Biden when these catastrophes were framed as having been close to occurring rather than distant – but especially when judging the president they opposed (vs. supported). The results reveal a novel way in which counterfactual thinking facilitates partisan reasoning. Evaluating a leader they oppose may decrease people's focus on how a catastrophe never occurred and increase their focus on how it nearly occurred. We discuss how imagination can fuel political polarization. • People sometimes blame leaders for disasters that never happened, but could have. • Blame is stronger when people oppose the leader and the catastrophe felt “close.” • Counterfactual closeness affects blame more when judging an opposed leader. • Imagination can influence moral judgment.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Published
2025-12-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104868
Primary Topic
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

When are leaders blamed for bad events that never happened? Partisanship and close counterfactual catastrophes

Neal J. Roese, Daniel A. Effron, Matejas Mackin, Kai Epstude
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
article

When are leaders blamed for bad events that never happened? Partisanship and close counterfactual catastrophes

Neal J. Roese, Daniel A. Effron, Matejas Mackin, Kai Epstude
article en

Abstract

How much blame do leaders deserve for counterfactual catastrophes : disasters that could have occurred under their watch but never did? We propose that when people oppose (vs. support) a leader, they are more likely to answer this question by considering how close the catastrophe came to occurring. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 1927), U.S. participants assigned greater blame for counterfactual catastrophes (e.g., an imagined nuclear attack) to Presidents Trump and Biden when these catastrophes were framed as having been close to occurring rather than distant – but especially when judging the president they opposed (vs. supported). The results reveal a novel way in which counterfactual thinking facilitates partisan reasoning. Evaluating a leader they oppose may decrease people's focus on how a catastrophe never occurred and increase their focus on how it nearly occurred. We discuss how imagination can fuel political polarization. • People sometimes blame leaders for disasters that never happened, but could have. • Blame is stronger when people oppose the leader and the catastrophe felt “close.” • Counterfactual closeness affects blame more when judging an opposed leader. • Imagination can influence moral judgment.

Journal of Experimental Social PsychologyVol. 123
Northwestern University (US), University of Groningen (NL), London Business School (GB)
Climate action
Openalex Percentile: Top 32%
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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