Rescuing Struggling Companies through Preventive Corporate Rescue Tools: Economic Implications of the French and Moroccan Special Mandate Models

This paper presents a comparative analysis of the “Special Mandate” as a preventive mechanism for rescuing struggling companies, focusing on French and Moroccan legislation. While existing studies focus on legal doctrine, this paper addresses a critical gap by linking these legal frameworks to their tangible economic outcomes, which is essential for evaluating their true effectiveness in the marketplace. The analysis contrasts two divergent legislative philosophies. The French model is notably broad, applying to nearly all types of enterprises regardless of their legal form, reflecting a proactive stance on economic intervention. It provides detailed procedural rules governing the agent’s (mandataire ad hoc) appointment, potential conflicts of interest, and the precise scope of the mission. Conversely, the Moroccan approach is significantly more restrictive, limiting the procedure mainly to commercial “traders” (commerçants) and containing legislative gaps that create procedural uncertainty for both debtors and creditors. While the procedure’s key advantages in both systems are its confidentiality and simplicity, its purely contractual nature presents a major limitation, as its success is entirely contingent upon voluntary creditor participation, which is often difficult to secure in distressed situations. The paper concludes that the French model’s enhanced legal flexibility correlates with superior economic performance, evidenced by outcomes such as a 2.6-fold higher debt recovery rate, offering a clear, data-driven recommendation for legislative reform based on proven economic stability.