Unfairness Attack and Unified Provable Defense on AI-Powered Internet of Energy
The critical energy infrastructure is undergoing two significant transformations: the rapid increase in renewable distributed energy resources (DER) and the digitalization of the energy sector, collectively shaping what is known as the Internet of Energy (IoE). Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a widely adopted tool for effectively allocating energy and managing sector-related resources, where ensuring fairness is essential. While inherent unfairness in AI systems is well acknowledged, little attention has been given to evaluating this unfairness and its real-world implications within the context of the IoE. In this study, we take a first step to elucidate the unfairness in AI-powered IoE systems induced by malicious users. We introduce Unfairness Score (UScore), a novel metric designed to evaluate the unfairness of machine learning models in real-world IoE scenarios. We then extensively evaluate unfairness attacks using three IoE tabular datasets, demonstrating that AI model fairness can be compromised through data poisoning, whether in centralized learning (CL) or federated learning (FL) settings. Notably, such compromises can occur when malicious users tamper with only a small subset of the data they control. Finally, we propose a novel approach that unifies fairness and differential privacy (DP) by leveraging DP as a provable defense mechanism. This approach provides a universally applicable solution to unfairness attacks, regardless of whether the learning tasks are classification or regression, and is effective in both FL and CL settings. Our contributions represent a significant step in addressing unfairness and privacy concerns in AI-powered IoE systems.
Authors
- Xingliang Yuan
- Ruoxi Sun (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-5180-2954)
- L Liu
- Carsten Rudolph (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9050-5675)
- Xin Yuan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5293-003X)
- Yansong Gao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5783-2172)
- Minhui Xue
- Hua Ma
- Surya Nepal
Institutions
- Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (AU)
- Georgia Institute of Technology (US)
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
- The University of Western Australia (AU)
- Data61 (AU)
- Monash University (AU)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Published
- 2025-12-24
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2025.3648192
- Primary Topic
- Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00